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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-1793

IN RE: ORPAH BARBEL,
Debtor
Orpah Barbel,
Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-00108
District Judge: The Honorable Raymond L. Finch, Chief Judge

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 5, 2006

Before: McKEE, BARRY and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: December 14, 2006)

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Orpah Barbel appeals from an order of the District Court of the Virgin Islands
dismissing her appeal from an order of the Bankruptcy Court. We will affirm.

Barbel and Chase Manhattan Bank (“Chase”) entered into a mortgage agreement
for $376,000, secured by two pieces of land Barbel owned. After she fell into arrears,
Chase sought to foreclose on the property, and on February 5, 1999, the Territorial Court
of the Virgin Islands granted summary judgment against her in the amount of $444,536.
On March 22, 1999, before the property could be sold, Barbel filed for voluntary
bankruptcy under Chapter 13, and an automatic stay was entered pursuant to § 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 362. On November 14, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court
dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding that Barbel had caused delays by claiming
ownership of property for which she could not furnish proof, had repeatedly substituted
counsel to represent her, and had failed to properly document a sale of inventory
necessary to finance her plan. It also determined that Barbel had not made consistent,
timely payments according to the plan, and that she had failed to produce documents
confirming the assets with which she proposed to pay.
Barbel filed a second petition on October 12, 2004, while her prior petition was on
appeal. The Bankruptcy Court again entered an order dismissing the petition with
prejudice. Again, Barbel had failed to make post-petition plan payments and was in
material default of the proposed plan. The Court also noted in its order that the plan as
filed would not have paid the proven secured claims and therefore violated the
Bankruptcy Code.
On March 8, 2005, Barbel moved for reconsideration. The Bankruptcy Court
denied the motion on June 20, 2005, and Barbel filed an appeal to the District Court on
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July 15, 2005. FirstBank Puerto Rico, successor in interest to Chase, moved to dismiss
Barbel’s appeal as untimely. Initially, the District Court denied the motion. After
FirstBank moved for reconsideration, however, the Court dismissed the appeal.
Barbel now appeals the order of the District Court dismissing her appeal. She does
not dispute that she filed her appeal late, arguing, instead, that she never received a copy
of the Bankruptcy Court’s order.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review findings of fact for
clear error and exercise plenary review over questions of law. In re Schick, 418 F.3d 321,
323 (3d Cir. 2005).
Rule 8002 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure states: “Notice of appeal
shall be filed with the clerk within 10 days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order,
or decree appealed from.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). Here, the ten-day period for filing
an appeal ended on June 30, 2005. Barbel’s appeal, filed on July 15, 2005, was, as she
concedes, clearly too late.
The ten-day mandate of Rule 8002 is jurisdictional. Whitemere Dev. Corp. v.
Township of Cherry Hill, 786 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Universal Minerals,
Inc., 755 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1985). Lest there be any doubt, while Rule 8019 authorizes
courts to suspend the requirements of many of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules, it
explicitly excepts Rule 8002. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8019. We thus have no discretion to
waive the time limit that governs when an appeal must be filed.
Failure to receive notice of an order is no defense. Rule 9022 provides that “lack
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of notice . . . does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve
a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed . . . .” Id. at 9022. It was Barbel’s
responsibility to monitor the docket.
The sole provision of the Bankruptcy Rules allowing for an extension of time
beyond the ten-day period requires a motion to be filed in the Bankruptcy Court.
According to Rule 8002(c), “a request to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal must
be made by written motion filed before the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired
[or] not later than 20 days after the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal . . .
upon a showing of excusable neglect .” Barbel never requested an extension.
The order of the District Court will be affirmed.

